Sommaire :
Retard PNC au pointage
GP
A340 ‘landed half-way down runway’
Rappel porte 5G des B 777
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Retard PNC au pointage
Dans le cadre du comité de suivi de l'accord collectif PNC, le ploblème du retard PNC sur un vol a été abordé. Il fera l'objet d'un avenant, mais d'un commun accord avec la compagnie ses termes s'appliquent dès maintenant, à savoir :
Moins de 2h30 de retard PNC : le PNC est placé en code MCPZ (retard), Il est soit libéré de service, soit mis en position de réserve 6h. Il n'aura pas à justifier ce retard à son encadrement et ne sera donc pas convoqué.
Plus de 2h30 de retard PNC : Le PNC est placé en code MMI (non présence) et est renvoyé chez lui. Il sera convoqué et devra justifier cette absence (éventuel retrait de 30ème).
Ce retard de 2h30 s'entend à compter de l'heure de pointage.
GP
Voici la règle qui doit être respectée, et nouvellement rétablie, dans les priorités d’embarquement selon les billets émis :
• R2 listé
• RN listé
• R2 non listé
• RN non listé
La possibilité de se lister jusqu'à la HLE par téléphone ou par Internet étant maintenant possible, listez-vous pour augmenter vos chances d’embarquer.
A340 ‘landed half-way down runway’
Source Flight International
As more details of accident emerge, Transport Canada evaluates ways of minimising the danger of overruns
The Air France Airbus A340-300 that overran at Toronto Pearson International airport on 2 August touched down so far along the runway that investigators believe it was all but impossible for it to be stopped on the concrete remaining, given the prevailing weather conditions. Meanwhile, Transport Canada says it is studying the potential of emerging technologies to minimise aircraft damage and injuries in the event of a runway overrun and is reviewing standards at the country’s airports.
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSBC) says the primary reason for the Air France flight AF358 overrun, according to the flight data recorder (FDR), is that the aircraft touched down nearly half-way along Pearson’s 2,745m (9,000ft) – excluding overruns – runway 24L in rain.
Lead investigator Real Levasseur says he is “pretty convinced there was no way the aircraft was going to be able to stop” under the prevailing conditions. He gives the touchdown point as 1,220m from the threshold, which would have left 1,525m remaining to the end of the runway, with a 60m runway overrun strip and 200m of off-runway level ground before the lip of the ravine in which the aircraft finally came to a halt.
Levasseur says that when the aircraft crossed the runway threshold it was between 50ft and 100ft from the ground with an indicated airspeed (IAS) of 146kt (270km/h) and ground speed of 164kt with engines at idle. The differential indicates an 18kt tailwind component at that height. At touchdown the IAS was 148kt, according to the FDR.
A business-class passenger on board the A340 has told Flight International how she pulled her seat belt “very tight” during the latter stages of the approach when she noticed that the runway “seemed to be going past for a long time before we landed”.
The TSBC says that as soon as the main wheels were on the runway, maximum reverse thrust was successfully applied and the spoilers deployed. Recorded brake pressure was correct, so there is no reason to believe the brakes were not effective. Aquaplaning has not yet been ruled out, according to Levasseur, but this will need more analysis. Another factor is that the second half of runway 24L has an average 0.07% downslope, says Levasseur, who also confirms that the pilots made no attempt to go around after touchdown.
According to the passenger witness, very soon after touchdown the landing run became extremely bumpy and the A340-300 finally came to a halt with several firm jolts. She adds that the aircraft had been holding for between 20min and 30min before making the approach and the captain had kept the passengers informed.
The first officer was the pilot flying, Levasseur says, and both pilots were extremely helpful when interviewed by the TSBC, although he would not reveal what was said. Levasseur confirms that all 309 people on board disembarked the A340-300 in about 90s, despite the fact that every seat was occupied. The vast majority escaped using only three of the aircraft’s eight emergency exits.
Meanwhile, criticism from pilots about Pearson’s runways – particularly 24L with a ravine 200m beyond the overrun strip (Flight International, 9-15 August) – and firefighters has prompted Transport Canada to say it will study arrester-strip technology and high-density foam fire extinguishant to see if they are warranted.
Co-pilot last to leave
The Airbus A340’s 309 occupants, comprising 297 passengers and 12 duty crew, carried out a copybook evacuation, vacating the widebody in around 90s. The cabin crew began the evacuation immediately after the A340 came to rest. Air France says that the accident aircraft was equipped with a 291-passenger, two-class cabin, and explains that the additional six passengers comprised three infants and three off-duty crew in jump seats.
As the diagram illustrates, several of the A340-300’s eight exits were not used, or only partially used, due to various factors, including the proximity of the fire, obstructions or slide deployment issues.
According to the investigators, the crew rejected the use of exits L3 (third from the front on the left) and L4 as unusable because they could see fire outside, and exit R3 because the escape chute had not deployed properly and there were “sharp obstacles” outside. Exit L2, just forward of the wing, “popped open” because of “fuselage stress” caused by impacts in the overrun, according to investigators, but it opened only partially and its slide did not deploy. Some passengers used it to evacuate despite this. Air France says the co-pilot was the last person to leave the aircraft, having conducted a search of the cabin to ensure it was clear.
NDLR : De façon plus claire et surtout vécue, comme nous le racontait hier notre collègue CCP du Toronto, seul le toboggan de la porte 4D ressemblait à ceux que nous utilisons au BEPN... ! Les deux autres mis en oeuvre étant soit pas déployés, soit mal gonflés ou d'utilisation difficile.
Lors de notre rencontre, nous avons bien entendu évoqué les nombreuses améliorations à apporter à notre environnement et à nos procédures de sécurité.
Le démontage du meuble de la porte 5G des B777 en fait partie et sera un bon indicateur de la volonté de la Compagnie de tirer les leçons de cette évacuation exemplaire, réalisée malgré de très pénalisantes conditions adverses . Une bonne raison pour ne pas surajouter aux conditions adverses par un meuble mal placé !
Il nous a aussi donné des nouvelles rassurantes de l'équipage, avec lequel il est en contact fréquent, à présent tous de retour chez eux. Deux d'entre eux souffrant toujours de problèmes dorsaux-lombaires.
Rappel porte 5G des B 777
Messieurs les responsables de cet aménagement, faites nous immédiatement démonter ce meuble en porte 5G des B777, ne recommencez pas et nous n'en parlerons plus !
Retard PNC au pointage
Dans le cadre du comité de suivi de l'accord collectif PNC, le ploblème du retard PNC sur un vol a été abordé. Il fera l'objet d'un avenant, mais d'un commun accord avec la compagnie ses termes s'appliquent dès maintenant, à savoir :
Moins de 2h30 de retard PNC : le PNC est placé en code MCPZ (retard), Il est soit libéré de service, soit mis en position de réserve 6h. Il n'aura pas à justifier ce retard à son encadrement et ne sera donc pas convoqué.
Plus de 2h30 de retard PNC : Le PNC est placé en code MMI (non présence) et est renvoyé chez lui. Il sera convoqué et devra justifier cette absence (éventuel retrait de 30ème).
Ce retard de 2h30 s'entend à compter de l'heure de pointage.
GP
Voici la règle qui doit être respectée, et nouvellement rétablie, dans les priorités d’embarquement selon les billets émis :
• R2 listé
• RN listé
• R2 non listé
• RN non listé
La possibilité de se lister jusqu'à la HLE par téléphone ou par Internet étant maintenant possible, listez-vous pour augmenter vos chances d’embarquer.
A340 ‘landed half-way down runway’
Source Flight International
As more details of accident emerge, Transport Canada evaluates ways of minimising the danger of overruns
The Air France Airbus A340-300 that overran at Toronto Pearson International airport on 2 August touched down so far along the runway that investigators believe it was all but impossible for it to be stopped on the concrete remaining, given the prevailing weather conditions. Meanwhile, Transport Canada says it is studying the potential of emerging technologies to minimise aircraft damage and injuries in the event of a runway overrun and is reviewing standards at the country’s airports.
The Transportation Safety Board of Canada (TSBC) says the primary reason for the Air France flight AF358 overrun, according to the flight data recorder (FDR), is that the aircraft touched down nearly half-way along Pearson’s 2,745m (9,000ft) – excluding overruns – runway 24L in rain.
Lead investigator Real Levasseur says he is “pretty convinced there was no way the aircraft was going to be able to stop” under the prevailing conditions. He gives the touchdown point as 1,220m from the threshold, which would have left 1,525m remaining to the end of the runway, with a 60m runway overrun strip and 200m of off-runway level ground before the lip of the ravine in which the aircraft finally came to a halt.
Levasseur says that when the aircraft crossed the runway threshold it was between 50ft and 100ft from the ground with an indicated airspeed (IAS) of 146kt (270km/h) and ground speed of 164kt with engines at idle. The differential indicates an 18kt tailwind component at that height. At touchdown the IAS was 148kt, according to the FDR.
A business-class passenger on board the A340 has told Flight International how she pulled her seat belt “very tight” during the latter stages of the approach when she noticed that the runway “seemed to be going past for a long time before we landed”.
The TSBC says that as soon as the main wheels were on the runway, maximum reverse thrust was successfully applied and the spoilers deployed. Recorded brake pressure was correct, so there is no reason to believe the brakes were not effective. Aquaplaning has not yet been ruled out, according to Levasseur, but this will need more analysis. Another factor is that the second half of runway 24L has an average 0.07% downslope, says Levasseur, who also confirms that the pilots made no attempt to go around after touchdown.
According to the passenger witness, very soon after touchdown the landing run became extremely bumpy and the A340-300 finally came to a halt with several firm jolts. She adds that the aircraft had been holding for between 20min and 30min before making the approach and the captain had kept the passengers informed.
The first officer was the pilot flying, Levasseur says, and both pilots were extremely helpful when interviewed by the TSBC, although he would not reveal what was said. Levasseur confirms that all 309 people on board disembarked the A340-300 in about 90s, despite the fact that every seat was occupied. The vast majority escaped using only three of the aircraft’s eight emergency exits.
Meanwhile, criticism from pilots about Pearson’s runways – particularly 24L with a ravine 200m beyond the overrun strip (Flight International, 9-15 August) – and firefighters has prompted Transport Canada to say it will study arrester-strip technology and high-density foam fire extinguishant to see if they are warranted.
Co-pilot last to leave
The Airbus A340’s 309 occupants, comprising 297 passengers and 12 duty crew, carried out a copybook evacuation, vacating the widebody in around 90s. The cabin crew began the evacuation immediately after the A340 came to rest. Air France says that the accident aircraft was equipped with a 291-passenger, two-class cabin, and explains that the additional six passengers comprised three infants and three off-duty crew in jump seats.
As the diagram illustrates, several of the A340-300’s eight exits were not used, or only partially used, due to various factors, including the proximity of the fire, obstructions or slide deployment issues.
According to the investigators, the crew rejected the use of exits L3 (third from the front on the left) and L4 as unusable because they could see fire outside, and exit R3 because the escape chute had not deployed properly and there were “sharp obstacles” outside. Exit L2, just forward of the wing, “popped open” because of “fuselage stress” caused by impacts in the overrun, according to investigators, but it opened only partially and its slide did not deploy. Some passengers used it to evacuate despite this. Air France says the co-pilot was the last person to leave the aircraft, having conducted a search of the cabin to ensure it was clear.
NDLR : De façon plus claire et surtout vécue, comme nous le racontait hier notre collègue CCP du Toronto, seul le toboggan de la porte 4D ressemblait à ceux que nous utilisons au BEPN... ! Les deux autres mis en oeuvre étant soit pas déployés, soit mal gonflés ou d'utilisation difficile.
Lors de notre rencontre, nous avons bien entendu évoqué les nombreuses améliorations à apporter à notre environnement et à nos procédures de sécurité.
Le démontage du meuble de la porte 5G des B777 en fait partie et sera un bon indicateur de la volonté de la Compagnie de tirer les leçons de cette évacuation exemplaire, réalisée malgré de très pénalisantes conditions adverses . Une bonne raison pour ne pas surajouter aux conditions adverses par un meuble mal placé !
Il nous a aussi donné des nouvelles rassurantes de l'équipage, avec lequel il est en contact fréquent, à présent tous de retour chez eux. Deux d'entre eux souffrant toujours de problèmes dorsaux-lombaires.
Rappel porte 5G des B 777
| Vous
n'êtes peut-être pas PN ou votre poste à
la
Direction d'Air France ou
ailleurs, vous tient éloigné de ces contingences
de
sécurité. De plus vous
n'avez jamais visualisé la porte 5G des B777 ! Vous ne comprenez donc pas ce problème. Ou encore, vous êtes journaliste et vous vous demandez si une évacuation en B777, sur le modèle de l'accident de Toronto, aurait été réalisée dans les mêmes conditions. Dans ce cas, faites chez vous le test suivant : Placez
une table de nuit sur un tiers de la largeur de votre porte
d'entrée et donnez votre avis ?
Nous sommes d'accord "C'est idiot car ce n'est pas fait pour ça et ça va gêner le passage !" PS : Désolé, mauvaise réponse, votre candidature au Marketing Central ne pourra pas être retenue ! A moins que vous n'y soyez déjà...? |
|
Messieurs les responsables de cet aménagement, faites nous immédiatement démonter ce meuble en porte 5G des B777, ne recommencez pas et nous n'en parlerons plus !
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UNAC PNC Air France |
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